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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CRnIINAL PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT-BILL OF PARTICULARS
Defendant was charged with having committed "aggravated
burglary of the inhabited dwelling [of certain named persons]
with intent to commit a theft and forcible felony therein, while
armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a sharp instrument."
The indictment also charged, in the same count, that, while in
the dwelling, defendant "did commit an aggravated battery with
said sharp instrument [upon a named woman] and did commit
a battery [upon the same woman] with a personal part of his
body."' Defendant requested a bill of particulars concerning the
forcible felony which he allegedly intended to commit when he
entered the building. The trial court sustained the state's refusal
to furnish this information. On appeal, held, affirmed. The de-
fendant was adequately informed of the nature of the forcible
felony which he allegedly intended to commit by the statement
in the bill of information that he had committed an aggravated
battery while in the building. State v. O'Brien, 77 So.2d 402 (La.
1955).
Article 235 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the following form of indictment 2 is sufficient to
charge the crime of aggravated burglary: "A.B. committed ag-
gravated burglary of the dwelling of C.D." The article permits
the addition of a more particularized statement of the offense to
this short form. Since the defendant is entitled to know the
nature of the charge against him,3 the article provides that the
judge may require the state to grant the defendant a bill of par-
ticulars setting forth more specifically the nature of the crime
charged. Although the Supreme Court has stated that this provi-
sion should be interpreted "liberally,"4 the granting or refusing
of a bill of particulars rests largely in the discretion of the trial
judge and few convictions have been reversed because the bill
of particulars supplementing a short form indictment was refused
or, if granted, was inadequate. 5 A bill of particulars may also be
1. State v. O'Brien, 77 So.2d 402, 403 (La. 1955).
2. The term "indictment" includes bills of information. See LA. R.S.
15:216 (1950).
3. This right is guaranteed the defendant by LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4. State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
5. Only one reversal was found: State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d
890 (1953),
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obtained by the accused when the indictment against him is in
the more detailed long form."
Defendant in the instant case first contended that the bill of
information was defective, in that it charged him with the com-
mission of several offenses in one count, presumably aggravated
burglary and two batteries. The court disposed of this contention
by referring to article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
That article permits the conjunctive cumulation in one count of
several offenses "disjunctively enumerated in the same law or in
the same section of a criminal statute . . .when it appears that
they are connected with the same transaction and constitute but
one act." The court concluded that the bill of information satis-
fied these requirements. 7 The court could also have found author-
ity for treating the charges that defendant committed two bat-
teries after entering the building as mere attempts to show the
intent with which he entered.8 This would have been similar to
the approach taken by the court in disposing of the principal
question in the case, concerning defendant's right to a bill of
particulars describing the forcible felony which the information
charged he intended to commit upon entering. The court in this
connection held that the charge in the information that defendant
committed an aggravated battery while in the dwelling "de-
scribed in detail in just so many words"9 the nature of the for-
cible felony which defendant entered with the intention to
commit.
The court's holding that defendant knew he was charged
with intending to commit aggravated battery before entering the
building, simply because he was charged with having committed
that crime after entering, seems questionable. As a matter of
fact, the information also charged that, after entering the build-
ing, he committed a second battery, upon a woman, "with a
personal part of his body." This allegation could as well be said
to describe "in detail in just so many words" an intent upon
entering to commit rape. It is doubtful that an accused's right to
6. State v. De Arman, 153 La. 345, 95 So. 803 (1923); State v. Selsor, 127
La. 513, 53 So. 737 (1910); State v. Clark, 124 La. 965, 50 So. 811 (1909). See
also Comment, 12 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 457, 458 (1952).
7. Article 60 of the Criminal Code, which defines the crime of aggravated
burglary, lists disjunctively the commission of a battery while in a dwelling
as one form of an essential element of the crime. The court stated that the
offenses charged were connected with the same transaction and constituted
but one act.
8. State v. Desselles, 150 La. 494, 90 So. 773 (1922).
9. State v. O'Brien, 77 So.2d 402, 404 (La. 1955).
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be informed of the nature of the charges against him should be
satisfied by such subtle implications in an indictment. Little
more justification for the state's refusal to grant defendant a bill
of particulars as to the intended forcible felony can be found in
the court's suggestion that this portion of the information could
be disregarded as surplusage, since the charge that he intended
to commit theft was sufficient. The accused was charged and
tried under an information charging dual intents and was refused
particulars as to one of them. If the fact that an information is
valid means that the defendant's right to a bill of particulars
has been satisfied, then the bill of particulars serves no useful
purpose in Louisiana criminal procedure.
Maynard E. Cush
FEDERAL PRACTICE-JURISDICTION-LOUISIANA WATERCRAFT
STATUTE, LA. R.S. 13:3479 (1950)
Plaintiff, widow of a Louisiana resident killed while working
as a ship repairman on a British steamer docked in New Orleans,
brought suit in federal district court1 under article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code 2 to recover damages for his alleged wrong-
ful death. Service of process was made pursuant to the Louisi-
ana Watercraft Statute, La. R.S. 13:3479, providing, in substance,
for service of process on the Secretary of State in actions against
nonresidents growing out of any accident arising from the non-
resident's operation, navigation, or maintenance of watercraft in
1. The modes of service of process in federal courts are provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Following is the pertinent provision of
Rule 4:
"(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making the service
with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
"(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3)
of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and com-
plaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United
States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the
service is made for the service of summons or other like process upon any
such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
that State." (Emphasis added.) FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
2. It is not within the limited scope of this note to consider the consti-
tutionality of LA. R.S. 13:3479 (1950) as applied to a case arising under the
Jones Act, 38 STAT. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952), instead of
Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
